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Abstract 
Insider trading is one of the crimes in the capital market that causes a lot of material loss to the victim. Such 
a large loss has caused fears of investors to trade on the capital market in Indonesia. For this reason, the 
government is trying to prevent insider trading, the government has made a Capital Market Law, but this is 
not enough. For this reason, policies need to be made relating to criminal sanctions for perpretators insider 
trading in the future. The research method used is the normative legal research method. With a conceptual 
approach, comparison and Law. The legal issues that will be examined are the legal and philosophical 
foundations of criminal sanctions for perpetrators insider trading and   criminal law policies relating to 
criminal sanctions for perpetrators insider trading in the future? The result is a legal basis for criminal 
sanctions for perpetrators insider trading is to provide a deterrent effect to the perpetrators so that it does not 
happen again and protect the public from insider trading. Policies relating to criminal sanctions for 
perpetrators insider trading are the use of schikking in resolving insider trading and by using non-litigation 
methods. 
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Abstrak 
Insider trading adalah salah satu kejahatan dibidang pasar Modal yang menimbulkan banyak kerugian materiil 
korban. Kerugian yang demikian besar menyebabkan adanya ketakutan dari investor untuk bertransaksi di pasar 
modal di Indonesia.  Untuk itu pemerintah berupaya mencegah insider trading tersebut pemerintah membuat 
Undang Undang Pasar Modal, akan tetapi hal tersebut belum cukup. Untuk itu perlu dibuat kebijakan berkaitan 
dengan sanksi pidana bagi pelaku insider trading di masa yang akan datang. Metode penelitian yang digunakan 
adalah metode penelitian hukum  yuridis normatif. Dengan pendekatan konsep, perbandingan dan   Undang 
Undang. Adapun isu hukum yang diakan dikaji  adalah landasan yuridis dan filosofis sanksi pidana bagi pelaku 
insider trading dan   kebijakan  hukum pidana yang  berkaitan  dengan sanksi  pidana bagi pelaku  insider trading  
di masa yang akan datang ? Hasilnya landasan yuridis sanksi pidana  bagi pelaku insider trading adalah untuk 
memberikan efek jera kepada pelaku agar tidak terjadi lagi dan melindungi masyarakat dari  insider trading. 
Kebijakan berkaitan dengan sanksi pidana bagi pelaku insider trading adalah adanya penggunaan schikking 
dalam menyelesaikan insider trading maupun dengan menggunakan metode non litigasi. 
 
Kata Kunci: sanksi pidana; insider trading; perbandingan. 
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Introduction 
The development of the capital market in Indonesia has a fairly large trading value, 
reaching 1,124.12 trillion until August 25, 2017. The volume of share transactions in 2016 
was 1,925.42 billion shares and until August 25, 2017, the transaction amounted to 1,889.63 
billion shares. JCI in 2016 amounted to 1,846,228 Trillion and until August 25, 2017 
amounted to 1,126,352 Trillion. Such a large trading volume has a positive impact (Henry, 
200,301) and negative (Gottchalk, 2010, 7). The positive impact is the velocity of money 
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(Mc.Gee, 2008: 206) which is so large it will produce huge profits for capital market 
players. The existence of foreign investment and domestic investment has an influence on 
regional economic growth. This is why this causes investment, especially from foreign 
investors (Sodik & Nuryani, 2005: 168). If investors invest capital through investments 
through the capital market, there will be confidence in the authority of the capital market 
in Indonesia by the international world, thereby driving development in all fields. 
The negative impact is the existence of new crime practices in the capital market, 
including insider trading, fraud, manipulation of the market in various forms, the existence 
of fraud, falsification of documents or asymmetrical information (Ataullah, Davidson, Le, 
Wood, 2014: 232). Case insider trading large stocks, traders also have a strategy in trading 
shares. (Meulbroek and Hart, 1997). 
Gil Bazier (1996: 81) gives opinion about insider trading,  In context of Insider 
Dealing, what an ‘insider’ will try to do is to buy  or sell (or suggest that others buy or sell) 
securities  when he is in possession of information  which may alter their price, but  will 
do so  before  such  information has been  made public and has therefore had a change  to 
have  any  such effect. Such information will usually relate in particular to the company in 
question. Insider trading indicators according to Indra Safitri (1998: 229) usually known 
when the perpetrator has sold the shares he bought, using inside information. He further 
explained that a significant number of shares was the trigger for investigators in the alleged 
violation. Insider trading generally occurs in the sale of very large shares in a certain period 
and the price will increase very rapidly, this allows capital market players to get an unfair 
advantage. 
This unreasonable profit value can be influenced by the information obtained from 
insiders, so investors buy or sell shares. If it is associated with insider trading elements 
consisting of securities trading, it is carried out by insiders, the inside information is inside, 
and the inside information has not been opened by the public. Stock trading is motivated 
by inside information, the purpose of which is to get an unfair advantage, so it is clear that 
insider information that has not been published can be the object of investor transactions. 
Whereas what becomes the object of capital market transactions is actually securities or 
shares, but then inside information can support the accuracy in making decisions of a 
company in conducting transactions on the stock market. 
The insider trading crime committed by the perpetrators is a negative impact of a 
large amount of funds that revolve in the capital market, so that arises the desire of the 
perpetrators to take profits as big as possible in a way that is not good from the capital 
market activities. One way to look for profits is to provide important information from 
companies that have not been published later will affect the trading of shares in the 
company through insiders Information that comes from these people for investors is 
always sought in order to increase company profits (Fishman and Hargetty, 1992; Mane, 
2005; Seyhun, 1986). This kind of information needs to be prevented so that no greater loss 
occurs. This is considering that insider trading is an unethical act, insider trading 
perpetrators will receive legal or social sanctions (Kaplan, Smuels, and Thorne B, 2009: 
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384-400) and cause large losses (Mc.Gee, 2010: 65) including in Singapore and in Indo-
nesia. For this reason, efforts are needed to prevent insider trading crime in Indonesia. 
Efforts to prevent losses due to insider trading made Law No. 8 of 1995 concerning the 
Capital Market. Based on the Capital Market Law which regulates prohibited acts along 
with criminal threats for those insider trading offenders in the form of imprisonment and 
fines. However, the threat of fines and imprisonment is not enough to overcome insider 
trading on the capital market. For this reason, it is necessary to establish a criminal law 
policy that regulates criminal sanctions for insider trading. 
 
Research Problems 
Based on the description above, the problem to be discussed is how the legal, 
historical and philosophical basis of criminal sanctions for insider trading. The second 
problem, how is the criminal comparison against insider trading perpetrators in Indonesia 
and Singapore as well as the upcoming criminal law policy related to criminal sanctions of 
insider trading perpetrators. 
 
Research Methods 
Legal research in English is called legal research or normative juridical research. 
Legal research is conducted to find solutions to legal issues that arise, namely to provide 
a prescription of what should be the proposed legal issues. The approach in this study uses 
the statute approach and the comparative approach and conceptual approach. 
 
Discussion 
Juridical foundation of criminal sanctions for insider trading 
Criminal arrangements in general in the Criminal Code consisting of basic crimes 
regulated under Article 10 to 1 which reads: basic crimes consist of capital punishment, 
imprisonment, fines, and imprisonment. Based on the principle of lex specialis derogat legi 
generalis (special provisions that rule out more general provisions), specifically the 
criminal will be regulated based on the respective laws. Likewise, criminal arrangements 
for insider trading in the Capital Market Law. 
The regulation of insider trading in Law Number 8 of 1995 concerning Capital 
Markets in Article 95, Article 96, Article 97. In Article 95 states that: Insiders from issuers 
or public companies that have inside information are prohibited from buying or selling 
securities:  
a. Issuer or Public company; or 
b. Other companies conducting transactions with the issuers or public companies 
concerned. 
Article 95 of the Capital Market Law contains the scope of insider trading, namely issuers, 
public companies, major shareholders, management or employees, public accountants, 
legal consultants, and parties who have work relations. Article 96 states that the insider 
referred to in Article 95 banned: 
Criminal sanctions for insider trading ... 
Ainul Azizah 
 
[487] 
 
a. Influence other parties to buy or sell the said Securities; or 
b. Give insider information to any Person who deserves to be able to use the 
information to make a purchase of securities 
Article 96 contains a prohibition against insiders to influence or provide inside 
information to other parties where it is reasonably suspected that information can be used 
to purchase securities. According to Indra, this prohibition is aimed at the possibilities 
that occur, wherein information and perpetrators of insider trading are carried out by 
others, usually are the closest people, both work relations and family relationships (Indra, 
234). 
Article 97 states that: 
(1) Any person who tries to obtain insider and insider information illegally and then 
obtains it is subject to the same prohibition as the prohibition that applies to insiders 
as in Article 95 and Article 96. 
(2) Any party who seeks to obtain inside information and then obtains it without 
violating the law is not due to a prohibition that applies to insiders as referred to in 
Article 95 and Article 96, as long as such information is provided by the issuer or 
public company without restrictions. 
The substance of Article 97 of the Capital Market Law poses a threat to people who obtain 
information by violating the law. Whereas what is meant by breaking the law is that the 
information can be obtained by stealing because the information is read and taken 
without the knowledge or permission of the owner of the information. This information 
is excluded people who get information to the public, for example, if a stock analyst who 
conducts research on the issuer's shares is allowed. However, Juha shows that people in 
the company show that they have insider trading motivation (Kalluiki, Nilson, Hell, 2009: 
37-53). Therefore, another article is then regulated which relates to the inside information 
contained in Article 98. Article 98 contains: 
a. Securities companies that have inside information about an issuer or public company 
are prohibited from conducting securities transactions of the issuer or public 
company, except if: 
b. The transaction is carried out not at his own expense, but at the behest of the 
customer; 
c. The securities company does not provide recommendations to its customers 
regarding the relevant securities. 
Regulations on insider trading in Law Number 8 of 1995 concerning Capital Markets 
in Article 95, Article 96, Article 97, Article 98. Arrangements relating to the criminal 
prosecution of insider trading actors are regulated in Article 104 of the Capital Market Law. 
Based on Article 104, it states that: every party that violates the provisions as referred to in 
Article 90, Article 91, Article 92, Article 93, Article 94, Article 95, Article 96, Article 97 
paragraph (1) and Article 98 is threatened with a maximum sentence of 10 years. (ten) and 
a maximum fine of Rp. 15,000,000,000 (fifteen billion rupiah). The regulation of criminal 
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sanctions for insider trading is formulated cumulatively between imprisonment sanctions 
and fines. Penalty sanctions in the form of a maximum of 10 years. 
Other regulations relating to the capital market include:  
1. Government Regulation Number 45 of 1995 concerning Capital Market Activities 
2. Government Regulation Number 46 of 1995 concerning Capital Market Examination 
and Investigation 
3. Rule XI.C.1, Bapepam Chairman's Decree number 58/PM/1998 concerning Insider 
Prohibited Securities Transactions 
4. Regulation X.K1. Bapepam Decree Number 86/PM/1996 concerning Information 
Openness which must be announced to the public immediately 
5. OJK Regulation Number 22/POJK.01/2015 concerning Procedures for Criminal 
Investigations in the Service Sector. 
From the description of the case above, insider trading arrangements in Indonesia since 
the enactment of Law Number 8 of 1995 concerning the Capital Market. Based on the rules 
of the Capital Market Law, there is a new term of crime, namely insider trading which had 
never existed in other laws. 
Then the question arises what about shareholders, can they be insider trading? 
Shareholders including major shareholders based on Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning 
Limited Liability Companies Article 3 paragraph (1) states that the company's shareholders 
are not personally responsible for the agreements made on behalf of the Company and are 
not responsible for the company's losses exceeding the shares owned. This shows that 
shareholders are only responsible for the number of shares held. Shareholders are not 
responsible for the company's name. However, shareholders are aware of important events 
and information whether they have been published or not yet published. So that 
shareholders can be the perpetrators of the dissemination of important information to 
certain parties. This information can be used in stock trading.  
Likewise with people who because of their position, profession or because of their 
business relationship with the company, it is possible to obtain inside information. People 
who because of their profession are associated with companies include: public 
accountants, notaries, legal consultants, appraisers. Public accountants, notaries, legal 
consultants and assessors know important information in companies that have not been 
published or that have been published. This important information can be used in stock 
trading. Important information if you are in the wrong person, especially in professions 
such as public accountants, notaries, legal consultants and appraisers, insider trading can 
occur. 
The parties as mentioned above include point: a) (including commissioners, 
directors, company employees); b) (major publicly traded shareholders); and c) (public 
accountants, notaries, legal consultants, appraisers) who are no longer parties before 
passing 6 months. This means that the parties remain parties before 6 months. And the 
parties must maintain important information whether it has been published or not yet 
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published to others. However, after the 6th month these parties are no longer parties. So 
the information they have is no longer important information. 
According to Asril Sitompul (2007: 16), based on the culprit insider trading is divided 
into four namely, 
a. Primary insider, consisting of; Directors, commissioners, senior officials who have 
access to information that has not been published. 
b. Secondary insider, consisting of consultants who are actively involved in company 
activities, representatives, advocates and other "outsiders" who have access to inside 
information. 
c. Tipper, included in this group are "insiders" who have information and then give it to 
outsiders to trade securities of the company. 
d. Tippe, who belongs to this group, is an outsider who gets information from the 
company's "insiders" and uses it to trade company shares.  
 
The cornerstone of the philosophy of criminal sanctions for insider trading 
Criminal sanctions are actually reactive to an act. So the focus of criminal sanctions 
is directed at one's wrongdoing through the imposition of suffering (so that the person 
concerned becomes a deterrent), then the focus of action is directed at giving relief so that 
he changes (Ahmad, 2013: 90-91). When examining criminal sanctions from a philoso-
phical perspective, there are three things that need to be outlined, namely: ontological, 
epistemological and axiological. 
Rizal Mustansyir (2008: 20) said that, in legal science ontology, it means that the 
presence of legal science in the scientific area. It means that what becomes legal reality, so 
that its presence is really something substantial. It is further related to the ephistemo-
logical aspects which are ways, systems, methods or theories related to legal science, so 
that the truth can be justified scientifically. Whereas axiological means the benefits and 
uses contained in the law.  
Basically, all philosophies of regulations in Indonesia must be in accordance with the 
philosophy of the Indonesian state, Pancasila, which strongly demands a balance between 
the harmony between individuals, society and the state. Likewise with the regulation of 
criminal sanctions related to insider trading in Indonesia which must be based on the 
perspective of Pancasila. Ruben Ahmad (2013, 98-99) said that criminal sanctions (based 
on criminal sanctions) based on the principles of Pancasila included: 
“First, based on the supreme precepts of the Almighty, in which punishment 
must function in mentally cultivating the person being convicted and 
transforming the person into a religious person. Second, the recognition of the 
dignity of human dignity and dignity as God's creation. Criminalization must 
not violate its most basic human rights and must not demean its dignity for 
any reason. The implication is that even if the convict is in prison, the elements 
and nature of his humanitarianism should not be ruled out in order to free the 
person concerned from his evil thoughts, traits, habits, and behavior. Third, 
foster national solidarity with others as citizens of the nation. Perpetrators 
must be directed at efforts to increase tolerance with others, foster sensitivity 
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to the interests of the nation, and direct not to repeat the crime. In other 
words, that criminal punishment needs to be directed to instill a sense of love 
for the Fourth nation, foster maturity as a citizen who is dedicated, able to 
control, and respect and obey the law as an expression of people's decisions. 
Fifth, raise awareness of the obligations of each individual as a social creature 
that upholds justice together with others as fellow citizens. In this connection, 
it is also important to remember that the government and the people must 
share in the responsibility of freeing the convicted from self entanglement, 
discipline, and social cruelty that surrounds them as criminals convicted as a 
social creature that still has rights and obligations. The aspect of liability is 
that the convicted person must undergo a period of misery that does not 
diminish and demean his human dignity.”  
 
Criminal sanctions for insider trading perpetrators must also be based on the 
principles of Pancasila as the philosophy of the Indonesian people. Thus, in essence 
(ontological aspects) of criminal sanctions for perpetrators of crime is the deterrence of 
the perpetrators so that it does not happen again. Criminal sanctions emphasize the 
element of retaliation (raiding) and is suffering that is deliberately inflicted on an offender. 
(Ahmad, 2013: 90) Criminal sanctions based on criminal law are not only providing 
retaliation to perpetrators of crime, but criminal sanctions against these perpetrators also 
aim at other communities not following the behavior of committing the crime. 
The epistemological aspects of criminal sanctions can be broken down based on the 
theory of criminal goal theory which is divided into 3 namely retaliation theory, goal 
theory, and combined/mixed theories. In the theory of retaliation based on the opinion of 
Vos argues that the theory of retaliation consists of objective retaliation and subjective 
retaliation (Hamzah, 2005: 31). Subjective retaliation is retaliation against the wrongdoer. 
Objective retaliation is retaliation for what has been created by actors in the outside world. 
Hegel argues that crime is a balance between objective retribution and subjective 
retaliation in a crime. 
According to J. Adenaes, the main purpose of crime according to absolute theory 
is to satisfy the demands of justice (to satisfy claims of justice) (Marlina, 2011: 45-46). In 
this regard, Immanuel Kant's thought in the "philosophy of law" which states that the 
criminal never carried out solely to promote other goals/good for the perpetrators 
themselves or society, but in all cases must be charged only because the person concerned 
has committed a crime (Muladi, 1998: 11). While Immanuel Kant said that the crime in the 
theory of retaliation is a demand for decency in society. Therefore the theory of retaliation 
states that crime does not aim for the practical, such as correcting criminals according to 
Andi Hamzah. In this retaliation theory in imposing a criminal act, it is no longer necessary 
to discuss the benefits to be obtained by the perpetrators after being convicted of a crime. 
A criminal offender who commits a crime results in a criminal sentence. Muladi said that, 
in the theory of absolute punishment or retaliation, it was stated that the crime was 
imposed solely because people committed a crime or a crime (quia peccatum est). 
The theory of retaliation or absolute generally outlines that the crime was imposed 
to avenge the perpetrators of crimes who have denied public order, violated decency, or 
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avoided vigilantism so that perpetrators need to be sanctioned. Van Bamelem states that 
this retaliatory theory legitimizes punishment as a means of retaliation for a crime 
committed by someone (Bemelem, 1997: 25). So that the nature of punishment according 
to absolute theory or retaliation is criminal is retaliation for the perpetrators of crime. 
The second theory is the theory of relative or objective theory wherein, this criminal 
law seeks the basis of criminal law in carrying out public order and its consequences, 
namely for the prevention of crime. Some experts who included contributing to the theory 
of relative or objective theory include, among others, van Hamel, Nigel Walker, von 
Feurbach, Muller. Muller in his theory states that the consequences of criminal prevention 
do not lie in criminal execution or in criminal threats, but in determining the criminal by 
judges in a concrete manner. 
According to van Hamel the purpose of a special intervention is to prevent the bad 
intentions of the perpetrators (dader) aimed at preventing the offender from repeating his 
actions or preventing the offender from carrying out the planned evil deeds. Von Hamel 
points out that the specific prevention of a crime is: 
1. The criminal must contain a frightening element in order to prevent criminals who 
have the opportunity to not carry out their bad intentions 
2. The criminal must have an element of correcting the convicted person 
3. Criminals have the element of destroying criminals that cannot be fixed (Hamzah, 
2004: 36) 
Nigel Walker said that the basis for justifying this theory of purpose was to reduce 
the frequency of crime. The flow adopted by Nigel Walker is called the reductive theory 
and its adherents are called reducers. The concept of utilitarian theory relating to 
punishment can be described as follows, namely that crime is not merely to retaliate or 
reward people committing a crime, but it has certain useful objectives. The criminal 
purpose in utilitarian theory is prevention. This means that criminalization for criminals 
is an attempt by people not to commit a crime or people not to repeat a crime so that the 
number of crimes in the community is reduced. Thus the security and welfare of the 
community can be achieved. 
The third theory is a mixed theory or verenigings theorieen which in its development 
is divided into 3 (three) theories, namely: a theory that tends to retaliation, a theory that 
focuses on community defense and a theory that tends to the theory of purpose. The 
experts discussing the combined theory include Pellgrino Rossi, Pompe, Grotius, Thomas 
Aquino, Vos. 
The first combined theory which emphasizes retaliation includes vereginings 
theorien or a joint theory stating that retaliation as the principle of criminal and the 
severity of the criminal must not go beyond a just retaliation, but it is stated that the 
criminal has various influences including repairing something that is damaged in society 
and prevention general. Basically the combined theory of Rossi is a combination of the 
theory of retaliation and goal theory. This combined theory has two objectives, namely 
giving a criminal response to the perpetrator with a measure that is in accordance with his 
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mistake in order to have the effect of improving behavior for the offender. Thus this 
combined theory takes the positives from both theories, namely the theory of retaliation 
and the theory of purpose. This theory not only wants retaliation but seeks to improve the 
behavior of the perpetrators of crime by improving behavior. Rossi's opinion as stated by 
van Bemmelen which states that the criminal aims to avenge mistakes and secure the 
community (Hamzah, 2004: 36). Whereas in the second combined theory which focuses 
on the defense of public order, Thomas Aquino is one of them. Whereas the third 
combined theory states that looking at the same is retaliation and defense against public 
order. Based on the theory of criminal purpose theory described above, it can be concluded 
ephistemologically that the existence of criminal sanctions for insider trading perpetrators 
aims to provide deterrence to the perpetrators. So that insider trading perpetrators who 
commit crimes will rethink remembering the witnesses who were given sanctions to be 
deterrent. 
The axiological aspect is a branch of philosophy that studies the benefits or uses of a 
science. The most well-known theory of utility is the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham. 
The theory of utilitarianism was born as a reaction to the metaphysical and abstract 
features of legal and political philosophy in the 18th century. This flow is a flow that puts it 
as a legal goal. Benefit here is defined as happiness. So whether it's good or bad, whether 
or not a law depends on whether the law gives happiness to humans or not. 
The principle put forward by Bentham is "The Greatest Happiness for the Greatest 
Number" which states that happiness is enjoyed by as many individuals as possible. 
Furthermore, Teriputra (2011: 61) is mentioned as a legal objective that is merely to provide 
happiness or happiness to as many citizens as possible. 
 The benefit or use of criminal sanctions for insider trading is to provide protection 
for victims and the public. This means that the existence of criminal sanctions for insider 
trading perpetrators will directly protect the victim from the perpetrators' actions and also 
protect the public from the existence of crime that creates insecurity in it. Therefore, the 
prevention of crimes committed by the state in the form of criminal sanctions in the Act 
aims to protect the public and provide a sense of security. Thus if security is achieved in 
the community, prosperity in the community will also be achieved. 
 
Criminal sanctions against Singapore insider trading perpetrators 
Insider trading in Singapore is regulated in the 2001 Securities Future Bill (SFB) 
amended by the Securities Futures Act 2017. Based on the Securities Future Act (SFA) 
regarding the actions of insider trading using the term inside information, regulated in 
Article 218 and Article 219 of the Securities Futures Bill in 2001. Article 218 regulators about 
acts that are prohibited by people who have a relationship that has information from 
people in connection with the company or company material facts. Article 218 included in 
this article is a person connected to the company having information about the company 
that is not publicly available but has a material effect on the price or value of the company's 
securities. People who are in contact may not sell and buy shares, people who are in contact 
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may not directly or indirectly communicate information to others, if violating paragraphs 
2 and 3 connected people can be prosecuted: anyone including the person connected. 
Pursuant to Article 218 paragraph (6) which is a connected party or an affiliated party is: 
a. Directors, secretaries and employees 
b. Recipients, company managers 
c. Law consultant 
d. Company liquidator 
e. Trustee 
Article 219 regulates acts that are prohibited by others who have inside information. 
The substance of this article is the same as Article 218, only the difference is that Article 
218 is connected or parties that are affiliated and have important and not yet announced 
information about the company while in Article 219 it contains about other people or not 
affiliated people and has important and not announced information about the company. 
The categorization of these two articles that distinguishes is people who have 
important information about the company while the same object is important information 
about the company while the same object is important information and has not been 
announced. So that the rules relating to criminal sanctions against offenders who violate 
Article 218 and Article 219 Security Futures Bill are the same. 
Criminal insider trading sanctions in Singapore are regulated in Article 221 Securities 
Futures Bill 2001 which states: 
(1)   A person who contravenes section 218 or 219, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be 
liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 7 years or to both. 
(2)  No proceedings shall be instituted against a person for an offence in respect of a 
contravention of section 218 or 219 after : (a) a court has made an order against him for 
the payment of a civil penalty under section 232; or (b ) the person has entered into an 
agreement with the Authority to pay, with or without admission of liability, a civil 
penalty under section 232(5). 
Article 221 of the SFB states that the criminal threat for insider trading perpetrators 
under articles 218 and 219 is a fine of not more than 250,000 Singapore dollars and a prison 
sentence of not more than 7 years, or both of them in paragraph (1). Paragraph (2) states 
that there is no process for persons or perpetrators of violations of Article 218 and Article 
219 of the SFA after the court makes an order against the perpetrators who pay civil 
penalties based on Article 232 of the SFA or the person has been bound in an agreement 
with the authorities to pay civil penalties without acknowledgment of responsibility. 
Cases that occur in Singapore, where insider trading cases are based on applicable 
laws the Securities and Future Act (SFA) specifically regulates insider trading which states 
that, if people doing insider trading are subject to fines of not more than 250,000 Singapore 
dollars and imprisonment no more than 7 years (Article 221 (1)). Based on paragraph (2) 
the article states that if the perpetrator faces a court and pleads guilty he will be subject to 
a civil penalty or civil penalty in accordance with Article 232. The case of Vincent Rajiv 
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Louis who carried out insider trading on PT Danamon's shares. Rajiv had previously 
learned of information about the acquisition of PT Danamon and DBS Bank Limited 
(DBS), so Rajiv bought a large amount of Danamon shares which would later be resold 
after Danamon was acquired by DBS. Rajiv made a profit of 173,965 Singapore dollars and 
his insider trading. This violates Article 282 (2) Vincent Rajiv must pay a fine of 434,912 
Singapore dollars. 
Payment of civil fines in Singapore as a consequence of the application of the concept 
of "jail or bill" that was coined by Packer. Packer said the concept of jail or bill was stated 
if the perpetrator admitted his actions, then the perpetrators were subjected to large fines 
without imprisonment and vice versa if the perpetrators did not acknowledge his actions 
then the perpetrators would be threatened with fines and imprisonment. Actors who do 
not acknowledge the bandage must be proven in court, thus the perpetrator must convince 
the judge that he did not commit the act. The advantage for the perpetrators who choose 
this process is the possibility of being free from prosecutors' demands. 
The civil penalty or civil penalty in Singapore is seen as more effective and efficient, 
especially in resolving economic crime cases, one of which is fraud in the capital market. 
This is because it is in accordance with the characteristics of economic crime that must be 
resolved quickly so that no greater loss occurs. The large losses will later have an impact 
on state losses that can be suppressed by the settlement of civil penalties imposed by 
Singapore. 
 
Criminal comparison of insider trading perpetrators in Indonesia and Singapore. 
Capital Market Law which regulates the actions of insider trading, especially in 
Article 95, Article 96 and Article 97. Penalty for insider trading criminal sanctions 
regulated in Article 104 are criminal penajra and criminal fines. Emphasizing the existence 
of imprisonment sanctions for perpetrators as an effort to deter perpetrators. Hegel stated 
that crime was a logical necessity and a consequence of crime. Included in insider trading, 
imprisonment and fines are deterrents so as not to repeat in the future. 
However, imprisonment does not always correspond to economic crimes including 
insider trading. Prison sentences for perpetrators of economic crimes including insider 
trading are not appropriate because of the characteristics of economic crimes that are 
always a great loss for the victims. Besides that, imprisonment sanctions for perpetrators 
of crimes (including insider trading) which are part of economic crimes are considered to 
have weaknesses for a variety of reasons, the first being imprisonment sanctions for insider 
trading principals, in particular, will not be deterred (Arief, 2010: 111-112) Second, it requires 
a long process in court so that it is feared to affect capital market activities in general. 
Third, sanctions imprisonment require quite expensive fees. Furthermore, according to 
Endah (2008: 98), it states that, in economic terms, there is no denying that the 
implementation of imprisonment if calculated from the costs that must be incurred (social 
cost) is so large, with imprisonment an actor (convicted) must finance and must be 
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provided with building facility facilities that place they are in the institution. And often 
cause state financial problems.  
While criminal fines are the principal crimes that have developed lately. Criminal 
fines are seen as more economical when compared with corporal imprisonment. Criminal 
fines will be very appropriate to apply criminal acts in the economic field including in 
insider trading. Named insider trading actors include companies or corporations and 
people (individuals). 
When compared with the rules relating to insider trading in Singapore it is very 
different. If the criminal act related to insider trading is generally the same, where there is 
an element of inside information in the insider trading. In the SFA (Securities Future Act) 
Article 221 which regulates the threat of insider trading in Singapore in the form of a prison 
sentence of no more than 7 years and a fine of no more than 250,000 Singapore dollars. 
Criminal sanctions for the above actors if the perpetrators do not recognize the violations 
committed and are considered against the state. If an insider trading offender admits to 
having committed an insider trading offense, based on the provisions of Article 221 
paragraph 2 it is stated that the court made an order against the perpetrator who paid a 
civil penalty under Article 232 SFA (5) or the person has been bound in an agreement with 
the authority to pay a civil fine without recognition liability. 
There are criminal differences in the rules of insider trading in Indonesia and in 
Singapore due to a different legal system. The legal system adopted by Indonesia is civil 
law and the legal system adopted by Singapore is common law. The civil law system has 
the characteristics of: how to achieve the ideals of national law in mainland Europe 
through the formation of legal codification, whereas in the United Kingdom (Common 
law System) the goal of achieving national law is through the formation of customs. Romli 
explained that in Britain legal unification was carried out and resolved by Bench and Bar 
in court, whereas in European Continental countries, the court was unable to create or 
form legal unification (Atmasasmita, 2000: 26-28). A further characteristic is the grouping 
of public and private law. Whereas in common law it is not the case 
The civil law system according to Romli, the law is considered as an engine of law 
reformer, not merely a re-record (Atmasasmita, 2000: 28). Therefore in civil law systems 
such as in Indonesia, every rule is written in the law. As in insider trading, the criminal 
threat consists of imprisonment and fines using a mechanism through litigation or court 
(based on the Capital Market Law). It is different from the criminal threat from insider 
trading in Singapore who applies a court order to determine fines for perpetrators who 
admit to having committed violations. This will not happen in Indonesia, because the 
mechanism only exists in the common law system. In civil law as practiced by Indonesia 
such a thing is not regulated. 
In criminal convictions or convictions in cases of insider trading that occur in 
Indonesia, the application is different in cases that occur in Singapore. The case of insider 
trading happening in Indonesia is the State Gas Company (PGN) year. The chronology of 
the PGN case is as follows: in an internal meeting PGN was informed that the pipeline 
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installation project on the islands of Java and Sumatra would be completed. If the project 
is completed, PGN will generate multiple benefits. Therefore, some PGN shareholders who 
happen to be PGN employees find out about this information and then sell their PGN 
shares on the stock exchange. The activity of selling PGN shares was very fast so that the 
stock price rose rapidly. Investors see that there is such activity causing all investors to 
buy PGN shares. However, the pipe installation project was not completed on time due to 
many obstacles, so PGN failed to get multiple benefits. This caused PGN's share price on 
the Jakarta Stock Exchange to drop significantly by 23.36% from Rp. 9650, - per January 11, 
2006 to Rp. 7400, - January 12, 2007. The decline was very closely related to the release of 
PGN's management the day before which stated that there was a decrease in the volume 
of gas to be distributed, from 150 mmscd to 50 mmscd. There are two material facts in this 
case, namely: first the delay of this gas project (in the context of commercialization) which 
was originally to be carried out at the end of 2006 was postponed until March 2007. The 
second material fact is that information has actually been known by management since 
September 12, 2006 (declining info gas volume) and December 18, 2006 concerning gas 
delays. 
All information suffered a very large loss due to insider trading events that occurred 
at the PGN. The perpetrators totaling 9 people were finally sent a return of profits from 
the sale of PGN shares. From this incident, 9 perpetrators were subjected to administrative 
sanctions in the form of return of profits with a total of Rp. 3,178,000. The details are as 
follows: 
1. Former director of PGN, WMP Simanjuntak was fined Rp. 2,330,000,000 (Rp. 2.33 
billion rupiah) 
2. Former company secretary, Widyatmo Bapang was fined Rp 25,000,000 (Rp 25 million) 
3. Adil Abbas was fined IDR 30,000,000 (IDR 30 million) 
4. Nur Subagyo Prijono was fined Rp. 53,000,000 (Rp.53 million) 
5. Iwan Heriawan was fined Rp. 76,000,000 (Rp.76 million) 
6. Djoko Saputro was fined Rp. 154,000,000 - (Rp. 154 million) 
7. Hari Pratoyo was fined Rp. 9,000,000 (9 million IDR) 
8. Rosichin was fined Rp. 184,000,000 - (Rp. 184 million) 
9. Thohir Nur Ilham was fined Rp. 317,000,000 (Rp. 317 million). 
The settlement in this case uses non-litigation method, whereas in the capital market law 
it is stated that the criminal threat for insider trading perpetrators is a prison sentence of 
Rp. 15. Billion rupiah at most and a maximum of 10 years imprisonment. 
Insider trading perpetrators are not processed using litigation or through courts as 
stated in the Capital Market Law. Perpetrators in the PGN case were settled by a non-
litigation mechanism. Criminal or criminal sentences in this case are fined sanctions by 
paying fines to all insider trading actors. The amount of the penalty for each actor is 
determined by the amount of profit obtained from insider trading. Thus insider trading 
perpetrators in the PGN case no longer need to be subjected to other crimes. The use of 
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non-litigation mechanism is not regulated in the Capital Market Law, but is a government 
win win solution solution to resolve the PGN case. 
In the case of insider trading that occurred in Singapore is the case of Vincent Rajiv 
Louis who carried out insider trading on PT Danamon shares. Rajiv had previously learned 
of information about the acquisition of Bank Danamon and DBS Bank Limited (DBS), so 
Rajiv bought a large amount of Danamon shares which would be resold after Danamon 
was acquired by DBS. Rajiv made a profit of $ 173,965 in his insider trading. This violates 
article 218, 219 relating to insider trading in the SFA. And was convicted under Article 232 
(2) Vincent Rajiv had to pay a fine of $ 434,912. (mas.gov.sg) Vincent Rajiv conducts insider 
trading in Indonesia against a company in Singapore, Bank Danamon, so that under Article 
213 SFA Rajiv is subject to violations of Article 218 and Article 219, namely trading with 
inside information. Rajiv then came to the Court and admitted that he had violated insider 
trading, therefore according to article 221 clause 2 it was stated that the Court could make 
an order against the perpetrators, namely Rajiv paid a civil penalty. The court determines 
civil penalties that must be paid by the perpetrators (Rajiv) based on Article 232 (2) which 
states the amount of the fine with the provisions that: 
a. if not exceeding 3 times the profits or losses suffered 
b. a fine of 50,000 Singapore dollars if the perpetrators are individuals and 100,000 
Singapore dollars if the perpetrators are corporations. 
In this Rajiv case, the fine was determined based on Article 232 paragraph (20 which 
did not exceed 3 times the profit. While the profit generated from insider trading was $ 
173,965, and the penalty to be paid by the perpetrator was $ 434,912. From the case of 
insider trading in Singapore represented by Rajiv this shows that the rules relating to 
insider trading are very effective by imposing civil penalties in the form of compensation 
to the victim in accordance with applicable regulations, so if carefully examined the rules 
relating to insider trading in Singapore in criminal imprisonment or criminalization 
prioritizing fines rather than imprisonment, imprisonment will be imposed on insider 
trading perpetrators if the perpetrators do not recognize the violations of insider trading 
that have been committed, whereas for insider trading offenders who have admitted to 
committing insider trading offenses in the form of civ il penalty or civil penalties in the 
form of compensation under Article 221 paragraph 2 SFA.    
Criminals in insider trading in Indonesia still use fines and imprisonment in 
accordance with Law No. 8 of 1995 concerning the Capital Market. In practice, criminal 
penalties for insider trading using prisons and fines such as Article 104 of the Capital 
Market Law have not been meted out as such. In general, the case of insider trading in 
Indonesia, the settlement of insider trading is more prone to a win-win solution so that 
the penalties imposed are generally in the form of fines or return of profits generated in 
insider trading by the offender. The use of a win win solution mechanism in the case of 
insider trading in Indonesia is in the form of an arbitration or mediation mechanism. 
Such is the case that distinguishes between crimes against insider trading 
perpetrators in Singapore and Indonesia. If in Singapore still uses fines and determined by 
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the court (litigation mechanism) if the perpetrator states a violation, whereas in Indonesia 
more often uses a non-litigation mechanism. 
Table 1. Comparison of rules relating to insider trading between Indonesia and Singapore 
The substance 
of the rules 
In Indonesia In Singapore 
 insider  trading The term used for insider 
trading is regulated in Arti-
cle 95, Article 96, Article 97 
of Law Number 8 of 1995 
concerning the Capital Mar-
ket 
The terms used in insider trading, and inside 
information are regulated in Articles 218 and 
219 of the Securities Future Act of 2006 
Forms of 
criminal 
sanctions for 
insider trading 
Criminal sanctions in insi-
der trading in the form of 
principal crimes in the form 
of imprisonment and fines 
in accordance with article 
104. 
Article 104 of the Capital 
Market Law that reads the 
threat of criminal fines is a 
maximum fine of Rp. 15 
Billion Rupiah and Criminal 
Prison for a maximum of 10 
years 
Additional crimes in the 
form of criminal damages 
provided for in article 111 
listed in other provisions. 
Criminal sanctions in the form of 
imprisonment and fines. Article 221 (1) of the 
Securities Future Act states that violating 
articles 218 and 219 guilty of committing a 
crime, then the fine is not more than 250 
thousand Singapore dollars or imprisonment 
of no more than 7 years. 
(2) There is no process against someone who 
violates articles 218 and 219 if the perpetrator 
goes to court and pleads guilty to having 
committed a violation and the court makes a 
compensation payment order based on article 
232 Securities Futures Bill in 2001. A civil 
penalty in the form of compensation is 
determined: 
a. if it does not exceed 3 times the profits or 
losses suffered 
b. a fine of 50,000 Singapore dollars if the 
culprit is per-person and 100,000 Singapore 
dollars if the corporate culprit. 
Criminal 
sanctions system 
The Capital Market Law 
does not regulate a system 
of imposing criminal sancti-
ons. Based on the Asex lex 
specialis derogat legi gene-
rali, the criminal prosecu-
tion system is based on KU-
HAP Article 101 
Criminal imprisonment with the concept of 
jail or bill. 
 
The criminal law policy deals with criminal sanctions against insider trading 
perpetrators in the future 
Systematic policies made by the government are various kinds of social policies. 
Social policy is part of legal policy, political policy, economic policy and others that aim to 
achieve the welfare of the community. Criminal law policy or criminal law policy is an 
integral part of efforts to protect society (social welfare) in criminal law policy consisting 
of a penal policy and non-penal policy (Arief, 1996: 2). Criminal law policy or penal policy 
is divided into three namely criminal law regulations (formulation), criminal law 
procedures (application), and criminal implementation mechanism (execution) (Arief, 
1996: 29). 
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The policy formulation of sanctions for insider trading actors is required specifically 
or specifically. The formulation is in the form of new breakthroughs related to the 
existence of alternative sanctions for insider trading. Perpetrators are not only given prison 
sanctions, or fines as in the Capital Market Law. But it can be sanctioned in the form of 
disciplinary action in terms of the Economic Criminal Act. The term in its development 
was called an additional crime. There are many types of additional sanctions based on the 
law. As in the Corruption Law there are additional sanctions in the form of payment of 
replacement money, in the Consumer Protection Act it states that sanctions for payment 
of compensation. Likewise with the PPATK Law, additional sanctions in the form of 
seizure are also mentioned in the Economic Criminal Act. 
Sanctions Alternative sanctions are placed in this additional criminal act which can 
then be made in preventing the spread of insider trading crimes, bearing in mind that 
these crimes are crimes caused by human greed so as to cheat in commerce. When 
compared with criminal sanctions in Singapore there are options in resolving insider 
trading crimes. First, if an insider trading offender in Singapore does not recognize or 
suspect an insider trading offense, then the offender is threatened with a heavier criminal 
namely a jail sentence and a fine of approximately 250,000 Singapore dollars. 
Sanctions such as civil penalties or civil penalties may be adopted in Indonesia as a 
breakthrough for alternative sanctions for insider trading. This civil fine can be done 
through a litigation mechanism through the court. Payment of large fines for insider 
trading players with this system can adopt the system that has been implemented in 
Singapore. Bearing in mind that the characteristics of insider trading or economic crime 
generally result in large losses, if threatened with the threat of imprisonment and fines 
with the existing system as it is now, where the process of examination before the court 
requires a long time. Therefore it is necessary to implement a system where the 
perpetrators are given detention in the form of large fines with a faster process. With a 
note that the insider trading perpetrator admitted that he had committed the crime which 
caused a great loss. The next process, the perpetrators are not subject to a proof process 
because the person concerned has admitted to committing a crime. Sanctions given to 
perpetrators are large penalties in accordance with applicable regulations. The application 
of this civil fine according to Singapore law can be implemented if there is an order from 
the court based on the Singapore Capital Market Law, namely Securities and Futures Bill, 
especially Article 232. 
This article also explains the amount of civil fines to be paid by insider trading 
players based on Article 232 paragraph (2), which is no more than 3 times the profits 
obtained from inside trading or no more than 3 times the losses he avoids. The application 
of civil or civil penalties carried out in Singapore is in accordance with the characteristics 
of economic crimes, especially insider trading. Aside from the process, the criminal fines 
were carried out quickly, the criminal fines were also carried out by litigation. this has 
never existed in Indonesia, settlement of cases that caused large losses in a fast way. In 
Indonesia, the settlement is done quickly if the terms of the criminal sanctions are fast and 
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the penalties are also light. A fast process of economic crime can be carried out by 
schikking. 
Schikking in the Economic Criminal Act is known and can be interpreted in terms of 
a peaceful fine. Schikking is carried out with the permission of the Attorney General to 
provide criminal relief to the perpetrators in economic crimes by replacing the payment 
of a sum of money in accordance with what the Attorney General has ordered. The reason 
for schikking is the existence of the principle of opportunity that the attorney general has 
decided to settle the case with other mechanisms outside the court. The intended public 
interest is the interest of the state not personal interests or the interests of the community. 
Another thing that can be adopted from criminal sanctions against insider trading 
perpetrators in Singapore is the choice of using the litigation process in a fast way without 
any evidence after confession. The perpetrators of direct insider trading who admit their 
actions and mistakes then use will be threatened with sanctions in accordance with Article 
232 of the SFA in the form of huge fines without the threat of imprisonment. Cases that 
have occurred are cases of capital market fraud with Rajiv perpetrators. If the perpetrator 
chooses not to acknowledge the act, it must be proven in court with a long process and 
sanctions imprisonment and fines. But if the perpetrators choose this process there is a 
possibility of being free from all charges if the evidence is proven not to have committed 
the crime. 
In Indonesia such a trial system is similar to a brief examination according to Article 
203 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, this short event has a mild case require-
ment and mild criminal threat. In this short examination program the maximum fine is 
Rp. 7500, - and a maximum imprisonment of 3 months. Actually this brief examination 
can be applied to the settlement of economic crimes because it is in accordance with the 
character of the economic criminal law which must be resolved quickly in order to reduce 
the amount of loss. However, in this economic criminal case the losses incurred are very 
large in number and the threat of speech is also heavy. This has become an obstacle to the 
rapid resolution of economic crimes. 
Therefore economic criminal acts, especially in insider trading, are sometimes 
settled using non-litigation methods. The non-litigation method intended is to resolve by 
arbitration or mediation between the two parties, both investors as victims and insider 
trading actors, as in the PGN case described above. Even though BAPMI or the Indonesian 
Capital Market Arbitration Board explained that criminal cases occurring on the capital 
market in Indonesia could not be resolved through arbitration or mediation mechanisms. 
However, what is happening is not the case, settlement of arbitration and mediation for 
capital market cases as a form of win win solution or the best solution for both parties. 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on the description above, it can be concluded that, first, Insider trading has 
been regulated as a type of criminal offense since the enactment of the Capital Market Law 
in Indonesia. Based on philosophical foundation, criminal sanctions for insider trading 
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are. Second, Differences in criminal threats for insider trading actors between Singapore 
and Indonesia, in which Singapore there is a civil penalty mechanism for insider trading 
perpetrators who admit to committing violations and the court imposes orders for 
payment of civil penalties based on applicable regulations (Article 232 (2) SFA ). In 
Indonesia there is no known civil penalty mechanism. Third, Future criminal law policy 
relating to insider trading is the need for new breakthroughs in the provision of criminal 
sanctions in accordance with the characteristics of economic criminal law, especially 
insider trading. 
  
Suggestion 
Suggestions that can be raised from the results of the discussion in this paper is, 
should the threat of imprisonment for insider trading perpetrators in Indonesia be 
inappropriate, given the imprisonment of perpetrators of economic crimes especially 
insider trading is not in accordance with the character of economic crimes. By paying 
attention to comparisons with applicable laws in Singapore which put forward criminal 
fines rather than imprisonment against perpetrators of economic crimes especially insider 
trading more effectively and efficiently. 
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